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Karen H. Rothenberg

Feminism, Law, and Bioethics

ABSTRACT. Feminist legal theory provides a healthy skepticism toward legal

doctrine and insists that we reexamine even formally gender-neutral rules to
uncover problematic assumptions behind them. The article first outlines feminist
legal theory from the perspectives of liberal, cultural, and radical feminism.
Examples of how each theory influences legal practice, case law, and legislation
are highlighted. Each perspective is then applied to a contempora.;: bioethical
issue, egg donation. Following a brief discussion of the common themes shared
by feminist jurisprudence, the article incorporates a narrative reflecting on the
integration of the common feminist themes in the context of the passage of the
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act. The article concludes thar gender does
matter and that an understanding of feminist legal theory and practice will
enrich the analysis of contemporary bioethical issues.

F

EMINISM SEEKS TO UNDERSTAN"TI AND TO VAL"C.t. the experiences, insights, and logic of women's lives. Feminisr legal theory
provides a healthy skepticism toward traditional legal doctrine and
insists that we reexamine even formally gender-neutral rules to uncover
the problematic assumptions behind them. It also challenges the traGitiona! split between private and public spheres, as well as rile way in
which traditional conceptions of justice translate into public policy.
Finally, feminist perspectives tend to value the importance of narrative,
thereby challengmg the traditionally "objective" approach ro case law
reporting. Stories put issues in context, just as case studies do for eiliicists
and health care providers, and hence help us to challenge the assumptions
we make about individuals and the role of the law in their li•.!es.
These important themes are reflected in a diversity of feminist legal
theories. 1 In this article, I outline the major feminist theories in order to
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pur the application of feminist jurisprudence in a broader analytical
framework. Hopefully, this framework will help to clarify the societal
implications of the legal rules, processes, and practices that shape our
responses to bioethical challenges. I illustrate the differences among
these theories by applying them to a contemporary bioethical issue, egg
donation. I then reflect on the common themes shared by various feminist theories by providing a narrative describing how feminist thought
influenced recent Maryland legislation on health care decision making.
FEMINIST THEORY, JURISPRUDENCE. AND PRACTICE

Liberal Feminism
Liberal feminism is based on a belief in formal gender equality, particularly in the economic and political arenas (see, e.g., Ginsburg 1971,
1975; Williams 1982). Since women possess the same capabilities as
men, liberal feminists claim that women should be entitled to equal
rights, equal employment opportunities, and equal pay.· Under this
equality model, gender classifications are ro be challenged because they
reflect and reinforce stereotypes that fail ro treat men and women as
individuals. Liberal feminism draws heavily on the notions of rationality, individual autonomy, and choice that are central to liberal political
theory. Thus, liberal feminists have focused primarily on the goals of
eliminating state-imposed gender distinctions and of preventing the state
from limiting individual choice.
One significant source of law for liberal feminist theory ~ the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that no state shall deny to any. person, equal protection
of the law. Simply put, similarly situated persons, namely men. and
women, should be treated equally. Advocates for women's equality first
tried, unsuccessfully, to utilize the Equal Protection Clause almost 125
years ago w6en a woman was refused the right to practice law (Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1872); In re Goodell,
39 Wis. 232 (1875)), and then again at the rum of the century to challenge "protective" labor laws that limited the number ol hours women
could work (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)). In both types of
cases, the court justified treating women differently from men based on
women's physical and mental attributes, their "nature," and their supposed need to be protected.
[ 70 ]
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It was not until the early 1970s that tenets of liberal feminism began
to take hold in the courts. The first case defending women's rights on liberal feminist grounds invalidated a statutory preference for men over
women in the appointment of estate administrators (Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971)). Many cases soon followed that challenged the constitutionality of laws that treated men and women differenrly and that advocated applying a higher standard of scrutiny to such cases. Ironically,
many of the successful test cases were brought by men who claimed that
various laws were unfair and unconsrirurional-for instance, laws
requiring men to meet more stringent tests of spousal dependency in
order to claim government benefits (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973)), laws establishing a higher legal drinking age for men (Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)), and laws rendering men ineligible for
alimony (Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)).
Concurrently, activists and the courts began ro ciiscover additional
protections in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 129 U.S.C.-~. §§206{d), 216217), which mandated that employers pay women the same wages as
men holding the same jobs, and in Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac: of
1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §2000e et seq.), which bannec sex discrimination in
employment and labor organizations. By 1971, the Supreme Court
upheld a finding of sex discrimination under Title Vll when an employer refused to hire mothers but not fathers with preschool children
(Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 1971)).
Perhaps the biggest challenge for liberal feminists has involved issues
that relate to pregnancy and childbearing. In 19-4, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a comprehensive stare disability insurance
plan that excluded benefits for pregnancy ( Geduldig t-·. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974)) and, in 1976, held that an employer ·was not in violation of
Title VII when medical benefits did not include COStS associated ·with
pregnancy (General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (19-6)).
Following these two rulings, feminists lobbied Congress to pass the
PregnanH Discrimination Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C.A. 52000e(k)), which
specifically states that sex discrimination under Title vn includes distinctions based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
The Supreme Court has since held that an emplo::er's feral-protection
policy that excluded fertile women from cerrain jobs constituted sex discrimination under Title VII (International Union, UAW v. johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)), bur it has nor issued any similar
rulings based on a constitutional analysis.
( 7I )
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Although liberal feminism has been quite successful in expanding
political and economic opportUnities available to white, middle class
women, it has been criticized for ignoring the constraints of race and
class and for adopting an assimilation model that benefits women only
to the extent that they act like men. In fact, some critics of "formal
equality" argue that affirmative action and certain "special" accommodations to women, such as childrearing leave, special child custody standards, and comparable worth schemes for job classifications, are necessary to counteract unfairness that results from what appear to be genderneutral rules (see, e.g., Littleton 1987; Law 1984). Many liberal feminists continue to maintain, howeve1; that women will not ultimately benefit from strategies that promote special treatment and reinforce gender
differences (see, e.g., Williams 1982).

Cultural Feminism
While liberal feminism basically emphasizes the essential sameness of
men and women, cultural or relational feminism focuses on their differences (see, e.g., Bender 1990; West 1988). Cultural feminism is grounded in the work of Carol Gilligan (1982) and other contemporary psychologists who suggest that men and women speak in a "different
voice." These theorists argue that men, on average, tend to analyze problems in terms of abstract rules and competing rights and to emphasize
the importance of autonomy. Women, by contrast, tend to be more contextual in their analysis of problems and to place more emphasis on preserving personal relationships.
Cultural feminists argue that many traditional legal d~ctrines and
practices are based on "masculine" values of autonomy and-abstraction
and fail to value the positive "feminine" concerns of responsibility, relationship, and essential connectedness experienced, for example, in the
modfer-child relationship. They have sought to balance the traditional
legal emphasis on male values by promoting a jurisprudential theory that
espouses a female ethic of care rather than a morality of rights. For
example, cultural feminists have suggested that the law look for mechanisms to resolve disputes that would provide alternatives to the traditional adversary paradigm (Menkel-Meadow 1983). Feminist models of
mediation have also been proposed to address bioethical disputes about
medical decision making among family members and health care professionals. It is believed, for example, that ethics committees are better
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equipped than the adversarial court system to foster and maintain family and physician-patient relationships. Similarly, cultural feminists have
suggested that courts apply a feminist ethic of care when determining
standards of negligence in order to recognize a duty to rescue strangers
where none currently exists {Bender 1988}. In order to promote and support a caring society, they argue, why should health care professionals
not have a legal duty to have to srop by the side of the road and provide
medical assistance to a person injured in an automobile accident?
Cultural feminists also have challenged the categorization of physicianassisted suicide as "a criminal act of murder," rather than as "an act of
caring" that would alleviate pain and suffering {Bender 1992).
Cultural feminism may also question current standards of proper
informed consent. Currently, standards of informed consem: require the
disclosure of information that a "reasonable person"" would want to
know in order to make an informed decision. However; if men and
women think and speak in "different voices," there may be no one common conception of a reasonable person. Indeed, current conceptions of
such a person tend to reflect a masculine notion oi reasonability, and
cultural feminists urge that we expand this notion to indude women's
values.

Radical Feminism
Radical or dominance feminism, like cultural feminism, arose in large
part as a response to the perceived inadequacies in liberal ieminist theory. Catherine MacKinnon, the major proponent of dominance theory,
argues with cultural feminists that men and women are di...•=ferent; however, unlike cultural feminists, she argues that these differences hrgely
reflect the fact that in society women are subordinate a-nd men are dominant (Mac~innon 1987; see also Littleton 1989). According to dominance theorists, it is this inequality in power to which the law must
respond. Moreover, since the primary source of women's oppression is
private power, particularly the threat of sexual violence, r.he solution is
not-as the liberal feminists often claim-less State itltervention, but
more. Radical feminists argue, for example, that the legal system should
abandon its traditional "hands-off" attitude toward violence in the family and move more aggressively to protect women from the abusive
power of men in the private sphere. These argumenrs have produced
concrete changes in some state laws that have made it easier for the
[ 73 ]
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police to intervene in domestic violence disputes and for criminal law to
recognize that rape is a violent act that can occur within the marital relationship.
MacKinnon (1979) was also instrumental in persuading lawmakers to
recognize that sexual harassment in the work place is sex discrimination,
and not just a private matter berween individuals. Within the last
decade, the evolution of sexual harassment as a legal claim has significantly changed the problematic dynamics of many historically maledominated professions, including law and medicine. (Of course, the
nursing profession has, for a long time, been all too aware of the negative dynamics that result from male domination.)
Whereas liberal feminists have concentrated primarily on expanding
women's choices and cultural feminists have concentrated on reforming
legal rules to reflect women's real experiences and to affirm women's values, radical feminists have argued that law should address the harms to
women that arise from conduct of other private actors, particularly men
and particularly with respect to sex and violence.

Postmodern Feminism
Postmodern feminism is a more recent addition to feminist discourse.
This perspective rejects the assumptions and generalizations at the core
of the preceding feminist theories. According to postmodern feminists,
no objective reality can describe the "essential" woman; consequently,
such feminists embrace the particular "situated" realities of all individual women. Postmodernists encourage feminists to consider real life
experiences influenced by each woman's race, class, age, and sexual orientation (see Frug 1992; Bartlett 1994, pp. 13-18; Cain 199<):; pp. 83841 ). Critical legal feminist scholars have incorporated themes of postmodernism by rejecting abstract universal theory and embracing the
need f~r a social policy that provides practical and just solutions to real
life problems (see, e.g., Rhode 1990; Radin 1990).
APPLYING DIFFERENT FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: EGG DONATION 2

How might the three major feminist theories enrich the debate over
contemporary issues in bioethics and public policy? Here I shall consider the issue of egg "donation," a process more accurately described as
the harvesting of eggs from one woman, usually with compensation, by
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an IVF clinic for use by a contracting woman and/or couple who desires
the birth of a baby. How might each feminist theory help us to frame and
answer the questions raised by the process?
The liberal feminist would frame the issue in terms of the similarities
and differences in the roles men and women face in such situations. For
instance, although men do not donate or sell eggs, they do donate and
sell sperm; since men can sell sperm and liberal feminists want to promote choice, perhaps women should be able to sell their reproductive
material as well. If we allow a marker for sperm, why not allow a market for eggs? On the other hand, liberal feminists will call our attention
to the extent to which egg and sperm donation are not truly analogous.
For example, egg retrieval is much more complex, risky, and time-consuming than is sperm donation. Thus, proper compensation would be
greater for the sale of eggs, but not so great as to preclude economic
arrangements between the infertile and those who want to sell their eggs.
As part of promoting "procreative liberty," however, the liberal feminist
will argue that it is important to have an informed consent process in
place that clearly spells out the benefits and risks of the procedure both
to the woman supplying the eggs and to the woman receiving them, as
well as the intent of all parries. For example, the woman who agrees to
have her eggs extracted should have no expectation of maternal rights.
and, absent a prior rdationship, no involvement with the intended mother or any future child. Such policies would closely parallel those currently in place for sperm donation. Given full disclosure and a fair and
reasonable compensation scheme, liberal feminists would support a public policy that recognizes egg donation as a choice for women.
In contrast, cultural" feminists might frame the issue by asking what
impact egg donation would have on family relationships, furu.~;._e connections, and the role of motherhood. If egg donation is viewed as a paradigm in which altruistic women help infertile women to become mothers, the cultural feminist might support it in the context of a noncommercial 5.rrangement. Egg donation would be characterized as a caring
gesture, involving an open arrangement in which the relationship among
both women and any offspring could continue to grow. On the other
hand, cultural feminists are not likely ro support a market for women's
eggs by IVF clinics. Such a scheme might be viewed as commodifying
motherhood and undermining caring relationships.
Radical feminists, finally, would be very suspicious of egg donation.
Whereas artificial insemination can be done with a turkey baster, egg
[ 75 ]
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donation and IVF procedures require a high level of reproductive technology. Radical feminists argue that this technology, which is controlled
by the male-dominated medical establishment, has historically tended to
manipulate women's reproductive lives. Thus, women who participate in
these procedures will be subject to the subordination of male power and
the medical hierarchy. Furthermore, radical feminists worry about the
potential for exploitation that such arrangements bring with them. First,
poor women will be vulnerable to exploiration, undergoing invasive procedures and selling their eggs because they need the money. Second,
infertile women seeking eggs, while they tend to be wealthier, will be
exploited by society's pressure to reproduce. At the same time, the maledominated medical establishment and any middlemen, including
lawyers, will financially profit from the arrangement. Finally, even in the
noncommercial setting, radical feminists might argue that egg donation
requires women to use other women ro perpetuate a sex stereotype that
only values women in the context of reproductive capacities. Thus, egg
donation in any context may result in the exploitation of women.
APPLYING COMMON FEMINIST THEMES:
THE MARYLAND HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT

In spite of these different perspectives, there are a number of themes,
as noted earlier, that unite feminist theory. First, gender does matter. All
feminists ask what impact a rule, practice, or policy will have on gender
and, more specifically, on the lives of women from diverse backgrounds
and experiences. Second, all feminist legal theory questions the objectivity of legal doctrine and its seeming gender neutrality, since.._ laws and
policies that are gender neutral on their face may not be so iri result or
application. Third, it reevaluates the miditional distinctiorr between
public and private spheres and the view that the law should respond only
to public issues. To make these various considerations come to life, feminists value the importance of the narrative to give voice and context to
the personal experiences of women.
The themes shared by feminist theories may be integrated to enrich
the analysis of important bioethical and public policy
issues. Let me
(
share my narrative and perspective on how this integration, quite undeliberately, enhanced the development of a major piece of recent health
care legislation, the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 (Md.
Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§5-601 to 618 {1994)). 3

[ 76 ]
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By the early 1990s, the Cruzan decision (Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)) caused many states, including
Maryland, to recognize the need for a comprehensive legislative
approach to the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. Prior
to this rime, Maryland had very little judicial guidance in rhe area-only
advisory opinions from the Attorney General's Office and a narrowly
drafted living will statute that was limited to those v.rith a terminal condition. In addition, Maryland had no durable power of attorney statute
that extended to health care decisions, and its surrogate consent statute
did not specifically address the termination of life-sustaining medical
treatment.
By March 1992, a drafting committee was formed under the auspices
of the Maryland Conference of Circuit Judges to consider comprehensive legislation that would address medical decision making for competent and incompetent persons, advanced direcrives, surrogate/family
decision making, emergency treatment and other health care decisions
by physicians, and judicial standards under Maryland guardianship law.
The committee was chaired by Judge John Carroll Byrnes, Circuit Coun
of Baltimore City, and included four additional members from the Office
of the Attorney General, the Health Law section oi me Maryland Bar,
the Maryland Disability Law Center, and the University of Maryland
School of Medicine. It is worth noting that this five-member committee
was all white and all male.
Within a few months the committee circulated dram of its proposed
legislation for public comment to a limited number of "interested parties." My first reaction was that while the committee did attempt to
address a number of issues, the result was a very lengthy, detailed, and
complex document. It seemed to cover every possible situation, and fur
every grant of authority, there seemed to be a cavea~ and then an exception to each caveat (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1086). In addition to my concern with the legalistic nature of the proposal, I noticed cenain obvious
problems that h!d disturbing gender implications. First, the living will
provisions of the proposal still maintained the pregnancy clause from
Maryland's 1985 living will stature, which stipulated that a living will
would not be honored during a woman's pregnancy. Thus,•a pregnant
woman, regardless of the viability of the fetus she carried, would have
fewer rights to terminate life support than similarly situated men and
nonpregnant women. Such a view is problematic from the perspective of
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each of the feminist theories. Liberal feminisrs would argue that such a
pregnancy clause would violate the constitutional rights of pregnant
women and would make bad public policy. Cultural feminists might
argue that the state should not impose irs judgment on that of the pregnant woman who is the one best equipped to evaluate her needs in the
context of her relationships. Radical feminists would object to a law that
subordinates pregnant women to the state in the determination of what
is best for her and her fetus. In spire of such concerns, members of the
drafting committee believed that maintaining the pregnancy clause
might prove to be a nonnegotiable issue with the Catholic Conference
and ultimately with the Maryland Legislature.
A second problem with the proposal was its inclusion of provisions
that appeared gender neutral on their face but proved nor to be on closer inspection. The proposal declared that the state has an interest in
ensuring that the welfare of minor children not be impaired as a result
of a competent individual's decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures (Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1074-75). Thus, although the
proposal declared that a competent individual has a right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment, it stated that if the individual was the sole
provider of a minor child and life-sustaining treatment would allow the
individual to continue to care for the child, that individual would have
to seek court approval before being permitted to refuse life support. The
provision considered neither the nature of the proposed treatment nor
the religious conviction of the individual (Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1070-71,
n. 19). Although the term "individual" includes both men and W<>f?en,
in fact the large majority of sole providers of minor children are
women--often women who are suffering from HIV/AIDS . ..Thus, this
provision had an unfair and disparate impact on women. This reality
was broughtrto the attention of the committee by a number of public
interest lawyers, almost aU of whom were women.
Third, and more generally, many of the proposal's provisions
appeared to excessively burden the family in the decision-making
process by requiring a legalistic rather than a supportive approach to
family relationships. The approach taken reflected a presumption that
the state needs to protect the individual from harm in every possible situation: for example, family members would have to go to court under
delineated conditions to prove that their ill relative would have wanted
to discontinue life support or that doing so would be in the relative's best
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interests (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1101). The proposal required written certification and justifications of actions by clear and convincing evidence.
In an early draft, even artificial feeding and hydration could not be withheld or withdrawn from an incapacitated person unless the patient had
previously stated in writing or orally the desire not to be kept alive
specifically by these means (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1104). Such restrictive
language gave little or no voice to the family to act in good faith on
behalf of a loved one.
By December 1992, the committee decided to present the proposal to
a broader audience, and the University of Maryland's Law and Health
Care Program agreed to organize a conference that would include public comment on the committee's proposal. I agreed to critique the proposal at the conference. I did not ground my critique in any one particular feminist theory; in fact, my approach integrated several feminist
perspectives.
To put the issues in context, I started my critique with a true story. A
week prior to the conference, a friend of mine had called me to ask for
some advice. Her mother had suffered a massive stroke and was no
longer able to speak. My friend could not care for her and had her
admitted into a nursing home in Maryland. A few years previously, her
mother had signed a standard living will form, which failed to specify
many details, such as whether she would want artificial nutrition and
hydration withheld or withdrawn. Neither my friend nor her mother
knew that the form only applied to a terminal condition. Her mother
had not gone to a lawyer to seek advice on how to fill out the form-in
fact, her mother had never been to a lawyer in her life. My friend was
upset because her mother had told her many times that she would not
want to be kept alive on feeding tubes and that she did not want to. be a
burden to the family if she could no longer care for herself. Of course,
her mother had never written any of this down. The nursing home was
claiming that they had no choice but to insert a feeding tube and that
these converlations and the living will form were of no relevance.
With this narrative as a frame of reference, I was able to ask whether
the committee's proposal addressed concerns such as those of my friend.
Obviously, many of the provider and consumer groups' attending the
conference had similar stories and frustrations, and many expressed concern that the proposal was too restrictive of both individual and family/
surrogate decision making. I argued that any proposal to legislate med-
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ical decision making should establish the presumption that family and
friends with close relationships to the patient are best able to give voice
to a family member or friend with limited decision-making capacity. As
we all agreed, most individuals do nor sign advanced directives or write
their wishes down, but that does not mean that only a court can protect
their interests. Not having filled out a form should not mean that your
family has no voice to act on your behalf. Rather, when a health care
provider, institution, or the state wants w challenge the decision of a surrogate, they should have the burden to petition the court, not the other
way around. Obviously, there may be times when an individual needs
the court's protection, but these circumstances should be regarded as the
exception rather than the rule. In addition, I urged that the patient care
advisory committee may serve as an alternative to the judicial process to
mediate such matters. Clearly, the perspectives of cultural feminism
helped to frame the deference to family decision making and the shift
from a presumption of distrust and protectionism to one of trust and
support of caring relationships.
Following this analysis, I focused i:nore specifically on the gender
implications of the proposal and its distrust of women. Not only were
families not to be trusted, but pregnant women would not be able to
exercise their right tO have a living will respected and sole care givers of
minor children, the majority of whom are women, would not be able to
terminate life-sustaining treatment without the court's approval. As a
result, the proposal created these women differently from all other competent individuals.
Many other participants at the conference expressed significant problems with the content and approach of the committee proposal. As a
result, a coalition was formed to draft an alternative. The coalition
included representatives of the elderly, women's groups, an Alzheimer's
association, and a number of medical, hospital, and legal organizations.
As I would later testify at a hearing on the issue, the original proposal
had ignored reality because it failed to recognize that not all feelings and
.I
contingencies can be codified (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1104); the alternative
proposal was much shorter, simpler, and less legalistic. Further, the coalition's alternative shifted the presumption to trusting the family, not the
state, to make decisions. To the extent that safeguards were included, it
was felt that they should not overly burden care givers making decisions
for incapacitated patients. Even though some recent empirical data suggest that surrogates may not make the same decisions that patients
[ 8o ]
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would make for themselves, many individuals still prefer that their family members, rather than physicians and judges, make these decisions
(Hoffmann 1994, p. 1102, n. 151, 152).
This shift in presumption to one of trust in caring relationships permeated the coalition proposal. The coalition proposal extended the conditions under which a surrogate could make decisions to withhold or
withdraw life support and gave a clear decision-making priority to those
most likely to be closest to the patient (Hoffmann 1994, p. 1093). It recognized that a close friend, and not just family members, might have the
authority to make decisions for an incompetent patient. It expanded the
use of an oral advanced directive to include appointment of a health care
proxy. The coalition proposal also prohibited a health care provider
from overriding the instructions of a surrogate without first going to
court and proving that the surrogate was not following statutory guidelines for decision making (Hoffmann 1994). The proposal modified the
guardianship law to allow a guardian to authorize the withholding or
withdrawal of life support without court approval if the patient had executed an advanced directive, and it treated artificial feeding and hydration like other forms of life-sustaining treatment. Further, both the coalition proposal and the committee's final proposal eliminated the provision that required competent individuals who were the sole care givers
of minor children to seek court approval for termination of life-support
decisions. Finally, and significantly, the coalition proposal did not
include a clause restricting the right of pregnant women to have their
advance directives followed.
Ultimately, the Maryland Legislature considered modifications of
both proposals. Political compromise resulted in the passage of the
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act on May 12, 1993. The statute
incorporated advanced directive forms that do include a section allowing women to write additional instructions concerning pregnancy. -If the
section is left blank, it is presumed that her choice of treatment will be
the same independent of whether she is pregnant. More generally, the
legislation ldopted the approach of the coalition proposal to presume
trust of care givers rather than courts with a few additional safeguards
(Hoffmann 1994, pp. 1108-30).
This legislative approach, which shifts reliance from rbe court to the
family, may have significant gender implications. An analysis of "rightto-die" cases by Miles and August (1990) found asymmetric gender patterned reasoning in which judges were less likely to consider evidence of
[ 8I
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women's preferences with regard to life-sustaining treatment. The
authors concluded that "the arbitrariness of gender patterned reasoning
and its effect of these cases amply illustrates the vicissitudes of institutional reasoning" (Miles and August 1990, p. 286). Thus, they suggested that courts not attempt ro construcr a person's preferences, bur rather
empower care givers to make decisions on behalf of an incompetent family member or friend.
Just as significantly, the legislation rejects an approach that presumes
that laws need to be crafted to protect: us from '4bad actors" rather than
to support care givers. As Leslie Bender, a cultural feminist, has
observed, "The social and ethical price of designing our laws and rules
for the bad actors is significant suffering and indignity to innocent,
humane people because of unnecessary restraints on their freedom to act
out of care in a manner responsive to particularized circumstances of
need" (Bender 1992, p. 532; Hoffmann 1994, p. 1102-3, n. 28).
On reflection, I believe that the .Y1aryland Health Care Decisions Act
was enriched by the integration of feminist perspectives. Although gender issues were not always front and center, feminist legal theory did, in
fact, contribute to the challenging of legal rules and presumptions.
Obviously, the bioethical and public policy debate over the new reproductive technologies, including egg donation, will also be enriched by the
diversity of feminist legal theory. Hopefully, both lawyers and bioerhicists will recognize that gender matters and will insist that "women's
experiences, varied as they are, be taken into account" (Carbone 1994,
p. 183). In the end this is what feminism is all about.
I wish to thank my colleagues ]ana Singer and Diane Hoffmann for theiN_nsighrs and
expertise, Maggie Little for her thoughtful comments and suggestions, and the other faculty and participants at the Kennedy Institute's Feminist Perspectives on Bioerhics course
for their collaborative spirit.

,

NOTES

1. See Rothenberg (1995). The analytical framework for describing the major
feminist theories was crafted in part from the following outstanding works:
Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Weisberg 1993); Feminist Legal
Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Bartlett and Kennedy 1991); "Gender
Law" (Bartlett 1994), "Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories"
(Cain 1989); and "Feminism and the Limits of Equality" (Cain 1990).
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2. This analysis was inspired in part by an outstanding presentation by
Rosemarie Tong at "Bioethics, Feminism and Reproductive Technology,"
AALS Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 8 January 1995.
3. For an outstanding discussion of the evolution of the legislation, see Diane
Hoffmann (1994).
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